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Abstract
We consider the problem of stopping a diffusion process with a payoff functional that renders
the problem time-inconsistent. We study stopping decisions of na¨ıve agents who reoptimize
continuously in time, as well as equilibrium strategies of sophisticated agents who anticipate
but lack control over their future selves’ behaviors. When the state process is one dimensional
and the payoff functional satisfies some regularity conditions, we prove that any equilibrium can
be obtained as a fixed point of an operator. This operator represents strategic reasoning that
takes the future selves’ behaviors into account. We then apply the general results to the case
when the agents distort probability and the diffusion process is a geometric Brownian motion.
The problem is inherently time-inconsistent as the level of distortion of a same event changes
over time. We show how the strategic reasoning may turn a na¨ıve agent into a sophisticated
one. Moreover, we derive stopping strategies of the two types of agent for various parameter
specifications of the problem, illustrating rich behaviors beyond the extreme ones such as “never-
stopping” or “never-starting”.
JEL: G11, I12
MSC (2010): 60G40, 91B06
Keywords: Optimal stopping, probability distortion, time inconsistency, na¨ıve and sophisti-
cated agents, equilibrium stopping law
1 Introduction
Optimal stopping is to determine the best (random) time to stop a stochastic process so as to
maximize a given payoff arising from the stopped state of the process. Applications of such a
timing problem are abundant including stock trading (e.g., the best time to sell a stock), option
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pricing (e.g., American options) and real options (e.g., the best time to invest in a project). Two
main classical approaches to solving optimal stopping problems are dynamic programming and
martingale theory, which are both based foundationally on the assumption of time-consistency,
namely, any optimal stopping rule planned today remains optimal tomorrow.
The assumption of time-consistency (also called dynamic-consistency) is rooted in the premise
that an individual’s preferences are consistent over time and will not change as time goes by or
circumstances evolve. However, this premise is all too vulnerable to stand the test of reality. A
gambler may have planned initially to leave the casino after having made $1000, but then decides
to go on gambling when this target has been reached. This is because the gambler’s risk preference
has changed after winning $1000; he has become more risk-seeking as the result of the triumph.
Indeed, extensive empirical and experimental studies all point to the fact that time-inconsistency
is the rule rather than the exception.1
In the absence of time-consistency, whatever an “optimal” plan derived at this moment is
generally not optimal evaluated at the next moment; hence there is no such notion of a “dynamically
optimal strategy” good for the entire planning horizon as is the case with a time-consistent model.
Economists, starting from Strotz (1955-56), instead have described the responses or behaviors of
three types of individuals when facing a time-inconsistent situation. Type 1, the na¨ıve agent,
chooses whatever seems to be optimal with respect to his current preference, without knowing the
fact that his preferences may change over time. Type 2 is the pre-committed agent, who optimizes
only once at the initial time and then sticks to the resulting plan in the future. Type 3, the
sophisticated agent, is aware of the fact that his “future selves” will overturn his current plan (due
to the lack of commitment) and selects the best present action taking the future disobedience
as a constraint. The resulting strategy is called a (subgame perfect) equilibrium from which no
incarnation of the agent has incentive to deviate.
In our view, a time-inconsistent model is largely descriptive as opposed to its time-consistent
counterpart that is mainly prescriptive. The objective of the former is to describe behaviors of the
different types of agents, rather than to advise on the best course of action2.
The first objective of this paper is to study the stopping strategies of Type 1 (na¨ıve) and Type
3 (sophisticated) agents for a general time-inconsistent problem.3 A na¨ıve stopping law is one such
that, at any given time and state, it coincides with the optimal stopping law at that particular
pair of time and state. Definition of equilibrium strategies in the continuous-time setting, on the
other hand, is more subtle. Starting with Ekeland and Lazrak (2006), and followed among other
by Ekeland and Lazrak (2010), Yong (2012), Hu et al. (2012), Bjo¨rk et al. (2017), and Hu et al.
(2017), an equilibrium for a control problem is defined as a control process that satisfies a first-
order inequality condition on some spike variation of the control. Ebert et al. (2017) apply this
definition to a stopping problem by turning the latter into a control problem. However, it remains
a problem to rigorously establish the equivalence between this first-order condition and the zeroth-
order condition in the original definition of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In this paper we follow the formulation of Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018) to define an equilib-
rium stopping law (although therein, a special stopping problem with a non-exponential discount
factor featuring decreasing impatience is considered). The idea of this formulation is that, for any
given stopping law, the sophisticated agent improves it by a level of strategic reasoning through
anticipating his future selves’ behaviors. The agent then performs additional levels of similar rea-
1Refer to the classical papers Strotz (1955-56), Kydland and Prescott (1977) for detailed discussions on time-
inconsistency, as well as Thaler (1981), Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) for empirical and experimental evidence.
2The strategies of the three types of agents coincide if the problem is time consistent.
3Pre-committed strategies (i.e., those of Type 2’s) have been investigated for specific class of problems, e.g., ones
involving probability distortion in Xu and Zhou (2013). See discussions below.
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soning until he cannot further improve it, which is an equilibrium. Mathematically, an equilibrium
is a fixed-point of an operator that represents one level of this strategic thinking. This in particular
coincides with the zeroth-order condition in the original definition of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The general existence of such a fixed-point is a largely open question. The first contribution
of this paper is to prove that, assuming that the state follows a one-dimensional diffusion process
and the payoff functional satisfies some (very mild) measurable and Fatou type conditions, any
equilibrium strategy can be obtained by applying the aforementioned operator repeatedly on an
initial stopping law and then taking the limit.
The second objective of the paper is to apply the general results to the problem when probability
is distorted. Experimental evidence supports the phenomenon of probability distortion (or weight-
ing); in particular that people inflate the small probabilities of occurrence of both extremely favor-
able and extremely unfavorable events. Behavioral theories such as rank-dependent utility (RDU;
Quiggin (1982); Schmeidler (1989)) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky and Kahneman
(1992)) include probability distortion as a key component and consider it as a part of the risk pref-
erence.4 On the other hand, the level of probability distortion associated with a same future event
changes over time because the conditional probability of that event evolves dynamically and the
distortion is nonlinear. Therefore time-inconsistency is inherent in the presence of (non-trivial)
probability distortion.
We study the stopping problem of a geometric Brownian motion and a RDU type of payoff func-
tional involving probability distortion, whose pre-committed stopping strategies have been studied
thoroughly by Xu and Zhou (2013) and are conceptually and technically useful for the present
paper.5 Besides characterizing the stopping behaviors of the na¨ıve and the sophisticated, we are
particularly interested in the connection and potential transformation among the three type of
agents: the na¨ıve agent in effect solves a pre-committed problem at every state and time who,
interestingly, may turn himself into a sophisticate if he carries out several levels (sometimes just
one level) of the strategic reasoning. In this regard, the fixed-point characterization of equilibrium
strategies brings about a significant advantage over the first-order characterization, as the former
describes the “reasoning process” with which an initial na¨ıve strategy is changed into a sophisticated
one. This change is demonstrated explicitly in this paper through practical examples motivated by
utility maximization and real options valuation. A related advantage of our fixed-point characteri-
zation is that one can easily generate a large class of equilibria through fixed-point iterations. This
is in contrast to the first-order characterization in the literature, where finding multiple equilibria
is usually a challenge.
Ebert and Strack (2015) show that under the assumptions leading to “skewness preference in
the small”, a na¨ıve agent following CPT will never stop “until the bitter end”. These assumptions
essentially ensure that probability distortion on small probabilities of big gains outweighs loss
aversion; hence at any wealth level the agent always favors a small, right-skewed risk over the
deterministic payoff resulting from the immediate stop. The antithesis of this result is presented in
Ebert and Strack (2017): assuming that there is an arbitrarily strong probability distortion on small
4At the outset the main difference between RDU and CPT is that the outcome utility function is concave in
the former while S-shaped in the latter. The difference is more fundamental in economic interpretations. In the
CPT, there is a reference point in wealth and the input of the utility function (called value function in CPT) is the
deviation of wealth from the reference point. The S-shaped value function captures the common psychological bias
that people are risk-averse for gains (when the aforementioned deviation is positive) and risk-seeking for losses (when
the deviation is negative). Both theories feature probability distortion which is the cause of time-inconsistency. So
some of the discussions in this paper will be on the two theories simultaneously.
5Due to time-inconsistency, the dynamic programming principle or the martingale approach does not work for
deriving pre-committed strategies. Xu and Zhou (2013) develop a new approach with a combination of the so-called
quantile/distribution formulation and Skorokhod’s embedding theory to solve the problem.
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probabilities of big losses and considering only two-threshold type of strategies6, a sophisticate will
stop immediately or, equivalently, “never, ever getting started”. This is because when the process is
sufficiently close to the upper threshold the stopped state under the two-threshold strategy becomes
highly left-skewed, which is unattractive to a CPT agent with a typical inverse-S shaped distortion
function. Knowing that the future selves who are close to the upper threshold will not carry out
this strategy, in equilibrium each current self will simply not start it.
The authors of these two papers acknowledge that both the “never stop” and “never start”
behaviors are “extreme” representing “unrealistic predictions” under the CPT. In this paper, we
complement their results by studying the cases in which the assumptions of Ebert and Strack
(2015) and Ebert and Strack (2017) do not hold, and showing that the behaviors of the na¨ıve
and sophisticated agents are far richer than the mere extreme ones. Indeed, depending on the
parameters of the geometric Brownian motion and the payoff functional, both types of agents may
want to start and end, relying on a (one) threshold-type stopping strategy. This suggests that
the RDU model may offer more realistic prediction if we allow the distortion functions to take
various shapes and, meanwhile, we take into consideration the intertwining relationship between
the preference of the agent and the characteristics of the process he monitors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate a general time-
inconsistent stopping problem, define the na¨ıve and sophisticated equilibrium stopping laws, and
introduce the operator that represents a strategic reasoning of a sophisticated agent. Section 3
characterizes the set of equilibrium stopping laws when the state process is one dimensional. In
Section 4 we apply the general results to the problem with probability distortion. We demonstrate
how time-inconsistency may arise in this case, followed by deriving sophisticated equilibrium strate-
gies in the presence of time inconsistency. Specifically, Subsection 4.3 presents a detailed case study
of how one can find a large class of equilibria and possibly compare/rank them, under a particular
model specification; Subsection 4.2 contains a series of practical examples where the payoff is either
a power utility or a European option payoff function, and obtains both na¨ıve and sophisticated
strategies. Finally, Appendices collect technical proofs.
2 Na¨ıve and Equilibrium Stopping Laws
This section sets out to introduce time-inconsistency for a general optimal stopping problem and
the ways we deal with the issue.
Consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) that supports a strong Markov process X : R+×Ω 7→ X
with initial value X0 = x ∈ X, where X, the state space of X, is a connected subset of R
d. We
will constantly use the notation Xx to emphasize the dependence of the process on the initial value
x. We denote by B(X) the Borel σ-algebra of X. Let F = {Ft}t≥0 be the P-augmentation of the
natural filtration generated by X, and let T be the set of all F-stopping times that may be infinite
with positive probabilities. Note that T includes non-Markovian stopping times7.
At any given state x ∈ X, a decision-maker (an agent) needs to decide when to stop the process
X. If he chooses to stop at τ ∈ T , he receives the payoff J(x; τ), where J : X × T 7→ R is a given
objective functional. The agent intends to maximize his payoff by choosing an appropriate stopping
6With a two-threshold type of strategy, the agent stops whenever the state process reaches a or b where a < b
are the two prescribed thresholds. Ebert and Strack (2017) consider pure Markovian strategies, which are essentially
two-threshold strategies.
7Non-Markovian stopping is widely used in practice. For example, the “trailing stop” in stock trading is a non-
Markovian selling rule. He et al. (2017) shows that in a casino gambling model under CPT path-dependent stopping
strategies strictly dominate Markovian ones.
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time τ ∈ T , i.e., he aspires to achieve
sup
τ∈T
J(x; τ). (2.1)
A well-studied example of the objective functional is the expected payoff
J(x; τ) := E[u(Xxτ )], (2.2)
where u : X 7→ R, a Borel measurable function, is the so-called payoff function; namely, u(x) is the
payoff he receives if he decides to stop immediately. Another example is a problem with general
non-exponential discounting:
J(x; τ) := E[δ(τ)u(Xxτ )], (2.3)
where δ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] is decreasing with δ(0) = 1. The mean-variance criterion can also be
considered, with
J(x; τ) := E[Xxτ ]− γVar(X
x
τ ), (2.4)
for some γ > 0. In Section 4 we will focus on an objective functional where the probability is
“distorted”, as defined in (4.8) below.
As {Xxt }t≥0 evolves over time, one can reexamine and solve the optimal stopping problem (2.1)
at every moment t ≥ 0. A natural, conceptual question arises: suppose an optimal stopping time
τˆx can be found for each and every x ∈ X, are τˆx and τˆXxt , t > 0, consistent with each other?
The notion of “consistency” in this question can be formalized as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Time-Consistency). Suppose an optimal stopping time τˆx ∈ T of the problem (2.1)
exists for all x ∈ X. We say problem (2.1) is time-consistent if for any t > 0 and any x ∈ X,
τˆx = t+ τˆXxt a.s. on {τˆx ≥ t}; (2.5)
otherwise problem (2.1) is time-inconsistent.
Intuitively, time-inconsistency means that an optimal strategy planned at this moment may no
longer be optimal at the next moment. It is well known that problem (2.1) with the expected payoff
in (2.2) is time-consistent.8 For a general objective functional, problem (2.1) is predominantly time-
inconsistent - for example when probability distortion is involved or non-exponential discounting is
applied.
Time-inconsistency renders the very notion of “dynamic optimization” null and void, for if one
cannot commit his future selves to the optimal strategy he chooses today, then today’s optimal
strategy has little use in a dynamic context. More specifically, for any given state x ∈ X at t = 0,
suppose the agent finds an optimal stopping time τˆx. He actually wants, and indeed assumes,
that all his future selves will follow τˆx, so that the optimal value supτ∈T J(x; τ) = J(x; τˆx) can be
attained. However, his future self at time t > 0 would like to follow his own optimal stopping time
τˆXxt , which may not be consistent with τˆx in the sense of (2.5). If the agent at time 0 does not have
sufficient control over his future selves’ behavior, τˆx will not be carried through, and the optimal
value supτ∈T J(x; τ) as initially figured out at t = 0 will thus not be attained.
As discussed in the introduction, three types of agents have been described in literature in the
presence of time-inconsistency. A na¨ıve agent simply follows an optimal stopping time τˆXxt at every
moment t ≥ 0, without knowing the underlying time-inconsistency. A sophisticated agent who is
8With the expected payoff (2.2), the tower rule holds: E[u(Xxτ )] = E [E[u(X
x
τ )|Ft]] for any τ ∈ T and t ≥ 0.
This means that the stopping problem at a given time t is consistent with the stopping problem at the initial time,
so long as the problem has not yet been stopped at t. Hence one can apply classical approaches such as dynamic
programming and martingale method to solve it; see e.g., Shiryaev (1978) and Karatzas and Shreve (1998).
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aware of the time-inconsistency but lacks commitment, by contrast, works on consistent planning:
he takes into account his future selves’ behaviors, and tries to find a stopping strategy that, once
being employed over time, none of his future selves has incentives to deviate from it. Finally, a
sophisticated agent who is able to commit simply solves the problem once at t = 0 and then sticks to
the corresponding stopping plan. The problem of the last type, the so-called pre-committed agent,
is actually a static (instead of dynamic) problem and has been solved in various contexts, such
as optimal stopping under probability distortion in Xu and Zhou (2013), mean–variance portfolio
selection in Zhou and Li (2000), optimal stopping with nonlinear constraint on expected time to
stop in Miller (2017), and optimal control of conditional Value-at-Risk in Miller and Yang (2017).
The goal of this paper is to study the behaviors of the first two types of agents. It turns out, as we
will demonstrate, that the solutions of the two are interwound, and both depend heavily on that
of the last type.
Now we provide precise formulations of the stopping strategies of the first two types of agents
(hereafter referred respectively as the na¨ıve and sophisticated agents). We first introduce the notion
of stopping laws, taken from Definition 3.1 in Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018).
Definition 2.2 (Stopping Laws). A Borel measurable function τ : X 7→ {0, 1} is called a (Marko-
vian) stopping law. We denote by T (X) the collection of all stopping laws.
The notion of stopping laws is analogous to that of feedback control laws in control theory. A
stopping law is independent of any state process; however for any given process, such a law induces
a stopping decision (in response to any current state) in the following manner.
Given the process X with X0 = x, each stopping law τ ∈ T (X) governs when the agent stops
X: the agent stops at the first time when τ(Xt) yields the value 0, i.e., at the moment
Lτ(x) := inf{t ≥ 0 : τ(Xxt ) = 0}. (2.6)
In other words, Lτ(x) is the stopping time induced by the stopping law τ when the current state
of the process is x.
We first define the stopping law used by a na¨ıve agent.
Definition 2.3 (Na¨ıve Stopping Law). Denote by {τˆx}x∈X ⊂ T a collection of optimal stopping
times of (2.1), while noting that τˆx may not exist for some x ∈ X. Define τˆ : X 7→ {0, 1} by
τˆ(x) :=
{
0, if τˆx = 0,
1, if τˆx > 0 or τˆx does not exist.
(2.7)
If τˆ is Borel measurable, we say that it is the na¨ıve stopping law generated by {τˆx}x∈X.
The stopping law τˆ ∈ T (X) defined above describes the behavior of a na¨ıve agent. For any
current state x > 0, a na¨ıve agent decides to stop or to continue simply by following the optimal
stopping time τˆx, if such a stopping time exists. If τˆx fails to exist at some x ∈ X, we must have
supτ∈T J(x; τ) > u(x) (otherwise, we can take τˆx = 0). Although the optimal value supτ∈T J(x; τ)
cannot be attained, the na¨ıve agent can pick some τ ∈ T with τ > 0 a.s. such that J(x; τ) is
arbitrarily close to supτ∈T J(x; τ), leading to J(x; τ) > u(x). That is, a na¨ıve agent determines
that it is better to continue than to stop at x ∈ X. This is why we set τˆ(x) = 1 when τˆx does not
exist in the above definition9.
9There is a technical question as to whether optimal stopping times {τˆx}x∈X of (2.1) can be chosen such that τˆ
defined in (2.7) is Borel measurable. The answer is positive under the standard expected payoff formulation (2.2).
For an objective functional under probability distortion, we will see in Sections 4 that τˆ is measurable in all examples
we explore.
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The formulation of na¨ıve stopping laws first appeared in Remark 3.3 of Huang and Nguyen-Huu
(2018) for a concrete problem under non-exponential discounting. Here, we extend the notion to a
general setting and allow the possibility that an optimal stopping time does not exist.
Remark 2.1. Time-consistency in Definition 2.1 can also be formulated as
τˆx = Lτˆ(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 : τˆXxt = 0} a.s. ∀x ∈ X. (2.8)
Note that the second equality follows from (2.7) directly. The equivalence between (2.5) and (2.8)
can be observed as follows. Suppose (2.5) holds. For any x ∈ X and a.e. ω ∈ Ω, let ℓ := τˆx(ω) ≥ 0.
By (2.5), τˆXxt (ω) = ℓ − t, ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ ℓ. This yields Lτˆ(x)(ω) = ℓ = τˆx(ω), and thus (2.8)
holds. Conversely, suppose (2.8) is true. For any x ∈ X and t > 0, on the set {τˆx ≥ t} we
have inf{s ≥ 0 : τˆXxs = 0} = Lτˆ(x) = τˆx ≥ t, and thus τˆXxs 6= 0 for 0 ≤ s < t. This implies
inf{s ≥ 0 : τˆXxs = 0} = t + inf{s ≥ 0 : τˆXys = 0}, with y := X
x
t . This, together with (2.8), gives
τˆx = t+ τˆXxt on {τˆx ≥ t}, i.e., (2.5) is proved.
The formulation (2.8) means that the moment at which a na¨ıve agent will stop, i.e., Lτˆ(x), is
entirely the same as what the original pre-committed optimal stopping time (which was planned at
time 0 when the process was in state x), τˆx, prescribes.
Now we turn to characterizing a sophisticated agent, by using the game-theoretic argument
introduced in Section 3.1 of Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018). Suppose the agent starts with an
initial stopping law τ ∈ T (X). At any current state x ∈ X, the agent carries out the following
game-theoretic reasoning: if all my future selves will follow τ ∈ T (X), what is the best stopping
strategy at current time in response to that? As the agent at current time can only choose to stop
or to continue, he simply needs to compare the payoffs resulting from these two different actions.
If the agent stops at current time, he obtains the payoff u(x) immediately. If the agent chooses
to continue at current time, given that all his future selves will follow τ ∈ T (X), the agent will
eventually stop at the moment
L∗τ(x) := inf{t > 0 : τ(Xxt ) = 0}, (2.9)
leading to the payoff
J(x;L∗τ(x)).
Note the subtle difference between the two stopping times, L∗τ(x) and Lτ(x): at any moment one
may continue under the former even though the latter may instruct to stop.
Some conclusions can then be drawn: (i) The agent should stop at current time if u(x) >
J(x;L∗τ(x)), and continue at current time if u(x) < J(x;L∗τ(x)). (ii) For the case where u(x) =
J(x;L∗τ(x)), the agent is indifferent between stopping and continuation at current time; there is
therefore no incentive for the agent to deviate from the originally assigned stopping strategy τ(x)
now. This is already the best stopping strategy (or law) at current time (subject to all the future
selves following τ ∈ T (X)), which can be summarized as
Θτ(x) :=

0, if x ∈ Sτ ,
1, if x ∈ Cτ ,
τ(x), if x ∈ Iτ ,
(2.10)
where
Sτ := {x ∈ X : J(x;L
∗τ(x)) < u(x)},
Cτ := {x ∈ X : J(x;L
∗τ(x)) > u(x)},
Iτ := {x ∈ X : J(x;L
∗τ(x)) = u(x)}
7
are the stopping region, the continuation region, and the indifference region, respectively.
Remark 2.2. The definitions of Θ in (2.10) and the three regions Sτ , Cτ , and Iτ are motivated by
the formulation in Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018). There, the objective functional J is restricted
to the form (2.3). This paper allows for a much larger class of objective functionals, specified by
Assumption 2.1 below.
Remark 2.3 (Non-Existence of Optimal Stopping Times). The way we formulate time-consistency
in Definition 2.1, which follows a long thread of literature in Economics and Mathematical Fi-
nance, hinges on the existence of (pre-committed) optimal controls/stopping times at every state.
When an optimal strategy fails to exist, it is unclear how to define time-consistency. Recently,
Karnam, Ma and Zhang (2017) point out this problem, and propose a possible way to formulate
time-consistency, without referring to optimal strategies, via backward stochastic differential equa-
tions (BSDEs). However, our game-theoretic approach described above – which eventually leads to
a sophisticated stopping strategy – does not rely on the existence of optimal strategies.
Given any arbitrarily given stopping law τ ∈ T (X), the above game-theoretic thinking gives
rise to an alternative stopping law, Θτ , which is at least as good as τ to this sophisticated agent.
Naturally, an equilibrium stopping law can be defined as one that is invariant under such a game-
theoretic reasoning. This motivates Definition 2.4 below.
However, to carry this idea through, we need to identify conditions for the objective functional
J under which Θτ is indeed a stopping law satisfying the measurability requirement per Definition
2.2. To this end, for any τ : X 7→ {0, 1}, we consider the kernel of τ , which is the collection of
states at which the agent stops, defined by
ker(τ) := {x ∈ X : τ(x) = 0}.
Remark 2.4. For any τ ∈ T (X) and x ∈ X, Lτ(x) and L∗τ(x) belong to T . Indeed, the measura-
bility of τ ∈ T (X) implies
ker(τ) ∈ B(X). (2.11)
Thanks to the right continuity of the filtration F,
Lτ(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ∈ ker(τ)} and L
∗τ(x) = inf{t > 0 : Xxt ∈ ker(τ)} (2.12)
are F-stopping times.
Now we introduce the assumptions that will ensure the measurability of Θτ .
Assumption 2.1. The objective function J : (X,T ) 7→ R satisfies
(i) for any D ∈ B(X), the map x 7→ J(x;T xD) is Borel measurable, where
T xD := inf{t > 0 : X
x
t ∈ D}. (2.13)
(ii) for any sequence {Dn}n∈N in B(X) such that Dn ⊆ Dn+1 for all n ∈ N,
lim inf
n→∞
J(x;T xDn) ≤ J(x;T
x
D), where D := ∪n∈NDn.
Remark 2.5. Assumption 2.1 is very mild, and is satisfied by the classical formulation (2.2), as
well as stopping under non-exponential discounting (2.3) and the mean-variance criterion (2.4).
As part (i) is easy to verify in these applications, the discussion below focuses on part (ii).
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Under (2.2), to ensure that problem (2.1) is well-defined, a standard condition imposed is
E
[
sup0≤t≤∞ u(X
x
t )
]
< ∞, where u(Xx∞) := lim supt→∞ u(X
x
t ). The dominated convergence theo-
rem can then be applied to get
lim
n→∞
J(x;T xDn) = J(x;T
x
D) (2.14)
for {Dn} ⊆ B(X), Dn ⊆ Dn+1, and D := ∪n∈NDn. Similarly, under (2.3) (resp. (2.4)), to ensure
that (2.1) is well-defined, a standard condition imposed is E
[
sup0≤t≤∞ δ(t)u(X
x
t )
]
< ∞ (resp.
E
[
sup0≤t≤∞(X
x
t )
2
]
< ∞). The dominated convergence theorem can then be applied to get (2.14).
With (2.14), Assumption 2.1-(ii) is trivially satisfied.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose Assumption 2.1 (i) holds. Then Θτ ∈ T (X) whenever τ ∈ T (X).
Proof. In view of (2.12), L∗τ(x) is simply T xker(τ). Thus, by Assumption 2.1 (i), x 7→ J(x;L
∗τ(x))
is Borel measurable, whence Sτ , Cτ , and Iτ are all in B(X). By (2.10) and (2.11),
ker(Θτ) = Sτ ∪ (Iτ ∩ ker(τ)) ∈ B(X),
which implies that Θτ : X 7→ {0, 1} is Borel measurable.
Definition 2.4 (Equilibrium (Sophisticated) Stopping Law). A stopping law τ ∈ T (X) is called
an equilibrium if Θτ(x) = τ(x) for all x ∈ X. We denote by E(X) the collection of all equilibrium
stopping laws.
Remark 2.6 (Trivial Equilibrium). As with almost all the Nash-type equilibria, existence and
uniqueness are important problems. In our setting, a stopping law τ ∈ T (X) defined by τ(x) = 0
for all x ∈ X is trivially an equilibrium. Indeed, for any x ∈ X, L∗τ(x) = 0 and thus J(x;L∗τ(x)) =
u(x). This implies Iτ = X. By (2.10), we conclude Θτ(x) = τ(x) for all x ∈ X.
To search for equilibrium stopping laws, the general (and natural) idea is to perform fixed-point
iterations on the operator Θ: starting from any τ ∈ T (X), take
τ∗(x) := lim
n→∞
Θnτ(x) x ∈ X. (2.15)
The above procedure admits a clear economic interpretation. At first, the (sophisticated) agent
has an initial stopping law τ . Once he starts to carry out the game-theoretic reasoning stipulated
earlier, he realizes that the best stopping strategy for him, given that all future selves will follow τ ,
is Θτ . He therefore switches from τ to Θτ . The same game-theoretic reasoning then implies that
the best stopping strategy for him, given that all future selves will follow Θτ , is Θ2τ . The agent
thus switches again from Θτ to Θ2τ . This procedure continues until the agent eventually arrives
at an equilibrium τ∗, a fixed point of Θ and a strategy he cannot further improve upon by the
procedure just described. In economic terms, each application of Θ corresponds to an additional
level of strategic reasoning.
Mathematically, we need to prove that the limit taken in (2.15) is well-defined, belongs to T (X),
and satisfies Θτ∗ = τ∗. In general, such results are not easy to establish, and remain largely an
open question10.
However, when X is a one-dimensional diffusion process we will be able to derive the stopping
strategies of the na¨ıve and the sophisticated agents in a fairly complete and explicit manner. This
10For a stopping problem with expected utility and non-exponential discounting, Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018)
show that fixed-point iterations do converge to equilibria, under appropriate conditions on the discount function and
the initial stopping law τ ∈ T (X); see Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 therein.
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is not only because, in the one-dimensional case, pre-committed stopping laws have been obtained
rather thoroughly by Xu and Zhou (2013) on which a na¨ıve strategy depends, but also because
the fixed-point iteration (2.15) turns out to be much more manageable and does converge to an
equilibrium, due to a key technical result (Lemma A.1) that holds only for a one-dimensional
process.
3 Equilibrium Stopping Laws: The One-Dimensional Case
Let X be an open interval in R, i.e., X = (ℓ, r) for some −∞ ≤ ℓ < r ≤ ∞. Consider Borel
measurable a, b : X 7→ R, with a(·) > 0, such that for any x ∈ X, the stochastic differential equation
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ a(Xt)dBt, X0 = x,
where B denotes a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion, has a weak solution that is unique
in law and does not attain the boundaries of X a.s., i.e., P(Xxt ∈ (ℓ, r) ∀t ≥ 0) = 1.
11
Define θ(·) := b(·)/a(·), and assume that
P
[∫ t
0
θ2(Xs)ds <∞
]
= 1, ∀t ≥ 0. (3.1)
Introduce the process
Zt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θ(Xs)dBs −
1
2
∫ t
0
θ2(Xs)ds
)
for t ≥ 0, (3.2)
which is by definition a nonnegative local martingale. Note that (3.1) is a standard condition
ensuring that
∫ t
0 θ(Xs)dBs is well-defined for all t ≥ 0 a.s.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose X is an open interval in R, Assumption 2.1 holds, and Z defined in
(3.2) is a martingale. Then, for any τ ∈ T (X),
ker(τ) ⊆ Iτ ,
ker(Θnτ) = SΘn−1τ ∪ ker(Θ
n−1τ), ∀n ∈ N. (3.3)
Hence, τ∗ in (2.15) is well-defined, with ker(τ∗) =
⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
nτ).
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose X is an open interval in R, Assumption 2.1 holds, and Z defined in (3.2)
is a martingale. Then, for any τ ∈ T (X), τ∗ defined in (2.15) belongs to E(X). Hence,
E(X) = {τ∗ ∈ T (X) : τ∗ = lim
n→∞
Θnτ, for some τ ∈ T (X)} =
⋃
τ∈T (X)
{ lim
n→∞
Θnτ}. (3.4)
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, τ∗ ∈ T (X) is well-defined and ker(τ∗) =
⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
nτ). As ker(τ∗) ⊆
Iτ∗ (by Proposition 3.1 again), Θτ∗(x) = τ∗(x) for all x ∈ ker(τ∗). For x /∈ ker(τ∗), we have
x /∈ ker(Θnτ), i.e., Θnτ(x) = 1, for all n ∈ N. In view of (2.10), this gives J(x;L∗Θn−1τ(x)) ≥
11This is guaranteed by appropriate conditions on a and b. Specifically, a(·) > 0 and local integrability of |b(·)|/a2(·)
imply the existence and uniqueness in law of a weak solution X. On the other hand, whetherX attains the boundaries
of X is fully characterized by Feller’s test for explosions. We refer to Sections 5.5.B, 5.5.C of Karatzas and Shreve
(1991) for a detailed exposition.
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u(x) for all n ∈ N. By (2.12), this can be written as J(x;T xker(Θn−1τ)) ≥ u(x) for all n ∈ N.
Thanks to Proposition 3.1, {ker(Θn−1τ)}n∈N is a nondecreasing sequence of Borel sets and ker(τ∗) =⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
n−1τ). It then follows from Assumption 2.1 (ii) that
J(x;T xker(τ∗)) ≥ lim infn→∞
J(x;T xker(Θn−1τ)) ≥ u(x).
This implies x ∈ Cτ∗ ∪ Iτ∗ . If x ∈ Iτ∗ , then Θτ∗(x) = τ∗(x); if x ∈ Cτ∗ , then Θτ∗(x) = 1 = τ∗(x), as
x /∈ ker(τ∗). Thus, we conclude that Θτ∗(x) = τ∗(x) for all x ∈ X, i.e., τ∗ ∈ E(X).
For the first equality in (3.4), the “⊇” relation holds as a direct consequence of the above result.
Note that the “⊆” relation is also true because for each τ∗ ∈ E(X), one can simply take τ ∈ T (X)
on the right hand side to be τ∗ itself. The last set in (3.4) is simply a re-formulation of the second
set.
This theorem indicates that under its assumptions every equilibrium can be found through the
fixed-point iteration. Moreover, it stipulates a way of telling whether a given stopping law is an
equilibrium. Any initial strategy that can be strictly improved by the iteration (namely the game-
theoretic reasoning) is not an equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, even if the agent’s initial
strategy happens to be already an equilibrium, he may not realize it. He does only after he has
applied the iteration and found that he gets the same strategy.
Any given stopping law τ will give rise to an equilibrium τ∗ according to (3.4); so in general
it is unlikely that we will have a unique equilibrium. In this paper, we are particularly interested
in the equilibrium τˆ∗ ∈ E(X) generated by the na¨ıve stopping law τˆ ∈ T (X) which is induced by
{τˆx}x∈X in (2.7); that is,
τˆ∗(x) = lim
n→∞
Θnτˆ(x) x ∈ X. (3.5)
The economic significance of choosing such an equilibrium is that it spells out explicitly how an
(irrational) na¨ıve agent might be turned into a (fully rational) sophisticated one, if he is educated
to carry out sufficient levels of strategic reasoning.
4 Application to Problems with Probability Distortion
In this section we apply the general setting and results established in the previous sections to the
case where the objective functional involves probability distortion (weighting) and the underlying
process is a geometric Brownian motion.
Let S = {St}t≥0 be a geometric Brownian motion satisfying
dSt = µStdt+ σStdBt, S0 = s > 0, for t ≥ 0, (4.1)
where µ ∈ R and σ > 0 are constants and {Bt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. Note that the
process S takes values in R+ := (0,∞) almost surely. In most of the discussions in this paper, S
is interpreted as the price process of an asset, although it could represent other processes such as
the value process of a project and similar discussions could be conducted.
Consider a nondecreasing, continuous function U : R+ 7→ R+ with U(0) = 0, and a strictly
increasing, continuous function w : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Here, U is the utility
function of the agent or the payoff function of the asset, and w the probability distortion function.
The agent’s objective is, for any given initial state s, to maximize his “distorted” expected payoff
maximize I(s; τ) :=
∫ ∞
0
w (P [U(Ssτ ) > y]) dy, (4.2)
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by choosing an appropriate stopping time τ ∈ T .12
So the agent intends to maximize his expected utility (or payoff) under probability distortion,
by stopping the price process at an appropriate moment. This formulation is motivated by several
financial applications, such as liquidation of a financial position, real options and casino gambling.
Note that with w(p) = p, we retrieve the standard expectation valuation.
Throughout the analysis in this section, we consider the parameter
β := 1− 2µ/σ2. (4.3)
The value of β and how “good” the asset S is are inter-connected. Shiryaev, Xu and Zhou (2008)
take µ
σ2
as the “goodness index” of an asset, which is included in (4.3). The larger this index is,
the higher the asset’s expected return relative to its volatility.
In the rest of this section, we will focus on the case β > 0, where time-inconsistency arises
genuinely for (4.2).13
4.1 The Case β > 0: Time-Inconsistency
We consider, as in Section 2.2 of Xu and Zhou (2013), the process Xt := S
β
t , t ≥ 0. That is, X is
the Dole´ans-Dade exponential of {βσBt}t≥0:
dXxt = βσX
x
t dBt, X
x
0 = x > 0, (4.4)
where x = sβ > 0. As a geometric Brownian motion with no drift, Xx is a P-martingale and
lim
t→∞
Xxt = 0 a.s., (4.5)
thanks to the law of iterated logarithms. As we will see subsequently, this fact plays an important
role in dictating a sophisticated agent’s behavior - the value of the underlying process diminishes
in the long run. Moreover, for any b > x,
P[T xb <∞] =
x
b
< 1, where T xb := inf{t > 0 : X
x
t = b}. (4.6)
Note that (4.6) follows from the hitting time probability of a standard Brownian motion to a linear
boundary; see e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1991).
Let u be defined by
u(x) := U(x1/β), x ∈ (0,∞). (4.7)
With β > 0, the transformed function u is nondecreasing with u(0) = U(0) = 0. The shape of u,
which can be convex, concave, or S-shaped (i.e., first convex, and then concave), depends on both
the shape of U and the coefficient β. Similarly, we define
J(x; τ) := I(x1/β ; τ) ≡
∫ ∞
0
w (P [u(Xxτ ) > y]) dy for x > 0, τ ∈ T . (4.8)
12In the literature, the distorted expected payoff is formulated as I(s; τ ) =
∫∞
0
U(y)d[1−w(1− F (y))], where F is
the distribution function of Ssτ . This expression and (4.2) are equivalent by Fubini’s theorem. Indeed,
∫∞
0
U(y)d[1−
w(1 − F (y))] =
∫∞
0
∫ U(y)
0
dxd[1 − w(1 − F (y))] =
∫∞
0
∫∞
U−1(x)
d[1 − w(1 − F (y))]dx =
∫∞
0
w
(
1− F (U−1(x))
)
dx =
∫∞
0
w (P [U(Ssτ ) > x]) dx, where U
−1 is the left (or right) inverse of U .
13For the case β ≤ 0, one may deduce from Xu and Zhou (2013) that problem (4.2) is time-consistent. Indeed, when
β = 0, Xu and Zhou (2013), p. 255, proves that τˆs := inf{t ≥ 0 : S
s
t ≥ x
∗} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Bt ≥ σ
−1 log(x∗/s)} is a (pre-
committed) optimal stopping time of (4.2), where x∗ := inf
{
x > 0 : U(x) = supy>0 U(y)
}
. The stopping threshold
for the state process Ss is always x∗, independent of the current state s. There is then no time-inconsistency. When
β < 0, Theorem 2.1 in Xu and Zhou (2013) shows that τˆs ≡ ∞, implying “never-stopping”, is the (pre-committed)
optimal stopping time. Again, no time-inconsistency is present here as τˆs ≡ ∞ does not depend on current state s.
12
Here, we allow τ ∈ T to take the value +∞ with positive probability: on the set {τ = ∞}, we
simply take Xτ = 0 in view of (4.5).
Under the objective functional (4.8), Xu and Zhou (2013) characterize the pre-committed opti-
mal stopping times for problem (2.1), stating that the problem may be time-inconsistent as β > 0.
The next example demonstrates this time-inconsistency explicitly.
Example 4.1. Take u(x) = xη with η ≥ 1, and consider the probability weighting function
proposed by Prelec (1998):
w(x) = exp(−γ(− log x)α) for some α, γ > 0. (4.9)
As u is convex, Theorem 4.5 of Xu and Zhou (2013) shows that problem (2.1), with J(x; τ) as in
(4.8), can be reduced to the optimization problem
sup
λ∈(0,1]
w(λ)u
(x
λ
)
. (4.10)
To solve this problem for our case, for each x > 0, set f(λ) := w(λ)u
(
x
λ
)
. By direct computation,
f ′(λ) =
w(λ)
λ
(x
λ
)η
[αγ(− log λ)α−1 − η].
Observe that f ′(λ) = 0 has a unique solution λ∗ = e
−
(
η
αγ
)1/(α−1)
on (0, 1]. Moreover,
f ′′(λ∗) = −αγ(α− 1)
(
η
αγ
)α−2
α−1 w(λ∗)
(λ∗)2
( x
λ∗
)η
.
Suppose α > 1, in which case w is S-shaped (i.e., first convex, and then concave). Then
f ′′(λ∗) < 0; moreover, f ′(λ) > 0 for λ < λ∗, and f ′(λ) < 0 for λ > λ∗. This implies that λ∗ is the
unique maximizer of (4.10). By the discussion following Corollary 4.6 in Xu and Zhou (2013), we
conclude that
τˆx := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t ≥ x/λ
∗} = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ e
(
η
αγ
)1/(α−1)
x
}
∈ T (4.11)
is a pre-committed optimal stopping time of (2.1) when the current state is x. A moving stopping
threshold causes time-inconsistency: for any t > 0, τˆx 6= t + τˆXxt on {τˆx > t}, unless X
x
t ≡ x;
thus, (2.5) is in general violated. More specifically, as X evolves over time, the agent continuously
updates the initial value x in (2.1) with current state y := Xt, and thus changes the original
stopping threshold x/λ∗ to y/λ∗ at time t. While being an optimal solution to (2.1) at state x, τˆx
will not be implemented as future selves will dismiss it.
A crucial observation here is that time-inconsistency leads the na¨ıve agent to postpone stopping
indefinitely. As 1/λ∗ > 1, we have τˆx > 0 for all x > 0, whence the na¨ıve agent will never stop at
any given moment and – as a result – will never stop.
Remark 4.1. Example 4.1 is reminiscent of Ebert and Strack (2015), which shows – under the CPT
setting – that a na¨ıve agent may defer his stopping decision indefinitely (hence disobey the origi-
nal pre-committed optimal stopping time) under the so-called “skewness preference in the small”
condition, which hinges on Assumptions 1 and 2 therein. Indeed, in Example 4.1, we have
ζ := sup
x>0
u′ℓ(x)/u
′
r(x) = 1 and w
′(0+) =∞,
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where u′ℓ and u
′
r denote the left and right derivatives of u, respectively. This shows that Assumptions
1 and 2 in Ebert and Strack (2015) are both satisfied: the former requires ζ < ∞, while the latter
is fulfilled if w′(0+) > ζ (see (3) therein).
In the presence of time-inconsistency, it is of interest to study how a sophisticated agent lacking
commitment might be doing by applying the general result Theorem 3.1. Specifically, how the
fixed-point iteration in Theorem 3.1 can be applied to find equilibrium stopping laws, under the
current context of probability distortion.
Technically, in order to apply Theorem 3.1 we need to first check the validity of its assumptions.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose β > 0. The objective functional (4.8) satisfies Assumption 2.1.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is relegated to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose β > 0 and the objective functional is given by (4.8). For any τ ∈ T (R+),
τ∗ defined in (2.15) belongs to E(R+), and hence (3.4) holds with X = R+. In particular, τˆ∗ defined
by (3.5) belongs to E(R+).
Proof. As X is a geometric Brownian motion with zero drift, the process Z in (3.2) is constantly
1 and thus a martingale. Because the objective functional (4.8) satisfies Assumption 2.1 (by
Lemma 4.1), the result is now a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1.
The fixed-point iteration in Theorem 4.1 has intriguing implications. The next result shows
that a drastic change in behavior takes place when a na¨ıve agent applies the fixed-point iteration
just once: a na¨ıve agent who would have never stopped (“until the bitter end” Ebert and Strack
(2015)) transforms himself into a sophisticated one who stops immediately.
Proposition 4.1. Let β > 0 and assume u(x) > 0 ∀x > 0. Then for τ ∈ T (R+) given by τ(x) = 1
∀x > 0,
τ∗(x) = lim
n→∞
Θnτ(x) = Θτ(x) = 0 ∀x > 0.
Proof. First of all β > 0 implies u is nondecreasing and u(0) = 0. By the definition of τ , L∗τ(x) =∞
∀x > 0. This, together with (4.5), implies J(x;L∗τ) =
∫∞
0 w(P[u(0) > y])dy = 0 < u(x) ∀x > 0. It
follows that Sτ = R+, whence Θτ(x) = 0 ∀x > 0.
Example 4.1 (Continued). We have shown that as α > 1, a na¨ıve agent postpones stopping
indefinitely, i.e., τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0. By Proposition 4.1, the corresponding equilibrium stopping
law τˆ∗ = limn→∞Θ
nτˆ = Θτˆ is the trivial equilibrium described in Remark 2.6, namely, to stop
immediately.
The na¨ıve, once thinking like a sophisticate, decides to stop immediately. What constitutes
the economic reasoning behind the proof of Proposition 4.1 is the following. At any given point in
time, assume that all the future selves will be carrying out the na¨ıve, never-stopping strategy. With
this in mind, the question is what to do now. There are only two options. If he is to follow the
original strategy, namely, to continue now, then according to (4.5) the value of the (un-stopped)
underlying process will almost surely diminish to zero and hence the payoff is zero. If he is to stop
now, then he can get some positive payoff because of the assumption u(x) > 0 when x > 0. This
simple comparison will prompt him to stop immediately.
The use of Theorem 4.1 will be further demonstrated in the next two subsections. In Subsection
4.2, we study practical examples motivated by utility maximization and real options valuation. We
are particularly interested in finding the equilibrium stopping law τˆ∗ ∈ E(R+) generated by the
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na¨ıve stopping law, as defined in (3.5). Through this construction of an equilibrium we will be able
to see an intriguing connection between a na¨ıve agent and a sophisticated one – in particular how
the former might turn himself into the latter by evoking strategic reasonings. In Subsection 4.3, we
show how the fixed-point iteration in Theorem 4.1 can be used to find a large class of equilibrium
stopping laws, under a specific choice of the transformed function u and the distortion function w.
How one can possibly compare these equilibria will also be discussed.
4.2 Examples: Utility Maximization and Real Options Valuation
In this subsection, we will study several examples motivated by utility maximization and real
options valuation. In all the examples, we will take the function U to be either U(x) = xγ for some
0 < γ < 1, a standard isoelastic utility function, or U(x) = (x −K)+ for some K > 0, a common
payoff function for real options. Our focus will be to compare the na¨ıve stopping law τˆ in (2.7)
with the corresponding equilibrium stopping law τˆ∗ in (3.5).
We start with assuming that w is inverse S-shaped (i.e., concave on [0, 1 − q] and convex on
[1 − q, 1] for some q ∈ (0, 1)), which indicates that the agent exaggerates the probabilities of both
“very good” and “very bad” scenarios. This type of w has been widely studied, as it is consistent
with empirical data of human decision making14. The literature on inverse S-shaped w, including
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Lattimore et al. (1992), Camerer and Ho (1994), Wu and Gonzalez
(1996), Birnbaum and McIntosh (1996), and Prelec (1998), among others, suggests three main mod-
els of w: 1) the one-parameter model
w(x) =
xγ
(xγ + (1− x)γ)1/γ
with γ∗ ≤ γ < 1, (4.12)
where γ∗ ≈ 0.279 is the minimal value of γ such that w is nondecreasing; 2) the two-parameter
model
w(x) =
αxγ
αxγ + (1− x)γ
with α > 0, 0 < γ < 1; (4.13)
and 3) the two-parameter model (4.9) with 0 < α < 1 and γ > 0.
To facilitate discussions in subsequent examples, let us present equivalent expressions for the
na¨ıve law τˆ . Suppose optimal stopping times {τˆx}x∈R+ exist. For each x > 0, let Fτˆx be the
cumulative distribution function of Xxτˆx , and Gτˆx := F
−1
τˆx
be the quantile function of Xxτˆx . Then,
the na¨ıve stopping law τˆ ∈ T (R+) in (2.7) can be expressed using Fτˆx or Gτˆx :
τˆ(x) :=
{
0, if τˆx = 0,
1, if otherwise.
=
{
0, if Fτˆx(·) = 1[x,∞)(·),
1, if otherwise.
=
{
0, if Gτˆx(·) ≡ x,
1, if otherwise.
(4.14)
An interesting consequence is that to identify the na¨ıve stopping law τˆ , it is not necessary to find
out what τˆx is specifically: in view of (4.14), τˆ is well-defined once the quantile function Gτˆx is
known. As shown in Xu and Zhou (2013), Gτˆx is the optimal solution to
sup
G∈Qx
∫ 1
0
u(G(y))w′(1− y)dy, (4.15)
where Qx := {G : [0, 1) 7→ R+ | G is a quantile function of X
x
τ for some τ ∈ T }; moreover, (4.15)
can be solved through certain mathematical programs. This approach, developed in Xu and Zhou
(2013) for solving pre-committed optimal stopping, is called the “quantile formulation” and useful
in the next result.
14He and Zhou (2016) relate an inverse S-shaped w with the emotion of hope (hope for the “very good” scenarios)
and fear (fear of the “very bad” scenarios) in decision making.
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Proposition 4.2. Suppose u is concave and w is inverse S-shaped with w′(0+) =∞. Assume that
the optimal quantile G∗x of (4.15), as specified in Theorem 5.2 of Xu and Zhou (2013), exists for
all x > 0.
(i) If supy>0 u(y) is attained, then
τˆ(x) = τˆ∗(x) = 1(0,y∗)(x) for all x > 0,
where y∗ := inf{y > 0 : u(y) = supz>0 u(z)} <∞.
(ii) If supy>0 u(y) is not attained, then
τˆ (x) = 1 for all x > 0,
τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is relegated to Appendix C.
Remark 4.2. All the three major forms of w proposed in the literature and supported by empirical
evidence, (4.12), (4.13), and (4.9) with 0 < α < 1 and γ > 0, are inverse S-shaped with w′(0+) =
∞. The result of Proposition 4.2 is therefore of sufficient practical relevance.
Proposition 4.2-(ii) is consistent with the results of Ebert and Strack (2015) and Ebert and Strack
(2017): the na¨ıve agent never stops while the sophisticated one stops immediately. Both Ebert and Strack
(2015) and Ebert and Strack (2017) assume that u is strictly increasing, which is stronger than the
condition that supy>0 u(y) is not attained. On the other hand, Proposition 4.2-(i) shows that if there
exists a state that maximizes the payoff function u itself, then it makes no sense for even the na¨ıve
to hold the asset forever: he ought to stop whenever such a state is reached. Moreover, because such
a threshold type strategy can be upheld by all the selves, it is also a sophisticated strategy. Note
that this conclusion also demonstrates that the respective extreme stopping behaviors of the two
types of agents reported in Ebert and Strack (2015) and Ebert and Strack (2017) depend critically
on the assumption that the payoff function u is strictly increasing. When supy>0 u(y) is attained
which violates the assumption, then both agents will instead adopt the same, threshold-type of
strategy.
The above result can be extended to the case where u is S-shaped.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose u is S-shaped (i.e., convex on [0, θ] and concave on [θ,∞) for some
θ > 0) and w is specified as in Proposition 4.2. Assume that the optimal quantile G∗x of (4.15), as
specified in Section 6 of Xu and Zhou (2013), exists for all x > 0. Then, Proposition 4.2-(i) and
(ii) still hold under current setting.
The proof of Proposition 4.3 is relegated to Appendix C.
Now we present several examples.
Example 4.2. Let U(x) = xγ for some 0 < γ < 1, and w be inverse S-shaped with w′(0+) = ∞.
In this case, u(x) = U(x1/β) = xγ/β .
• Case I: 0 < γ/β ≤ 1.
As u is concave, we conclude from Proposition 4.2 that τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0, and τˆ∗(x) = 0
for all x > 0.
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• Case II: γ/β > 1.
As u is convex, as mentioned in Example 4.1, the optimal value supτ∈T J(x; τ) can be com-
puted as (4.10) for all x > 0. If w is given by (4.9) with 0 < α < 1 and γ > 0. Observe that
the optimal value is infinite for all x > 0:
sup
τ∈T
J(x; τ) = lim
λ↓0
w(λ)u
(x
λ
)
= lim
λ↓0
exp(−γ(− log(λ))α)
λη
xη = lim
y→∞
e−γy
α
e−ηy
xη =∞, (4.16)
where the last equality follows from α < 1. If an optimal stopping time τˆx exists, we must
have τˆx > 0 as stopping immediately does not attain the optimal value (as u(x) < ∞). The
na¨ıve stopping law is therefore to continue perpetually (i.e., τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0), and the
corresponding sophisticated behavior is to stop immediately (i.e., τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0).
If we instead take w to be (4.12) or (4.13), similar calculations again yield supτ∈T J(x; τ) =
limλ↓0 w(λ)u
(
x
λ
)
= ∞. Thus, we have the same conclusion that τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0 and
τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
Example 4.3. Let U(x) = (x−K)+ for some K > 0, and w be inverse S-shaped with w′(0+) =∞.
In this case u(x) = U(x1/β) = (x1/β −K)+.
• Case I: 0 < β ≤ 1.
As u is convex, the optimal value supτ∈T J(x; τ) can be computed as (4.10) for all x > 0. If
w is given by (4.9) with 0 < α < 1 and γ > 0. Similarly to (4.16), the optimal value is infinite
for all x > 0:
sup
τ∈T
J(x; τ) = lim
λ↓0
w(λ)u
(x
λ
)
= lim
λ↓0
exp(−γ(− log(λ))α)
[(x
λ
)1/β
−K
]
= lim
y→∞
(
e−γy
α
e−(1/β)y
x1/β − e−γy
α
K
)
=∞,
where the last equality follows from α < 1. Thus, as explained in Case II of Example 4.2,
the na¨ıve stopping law is to continue perpetually (i.e., τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0), and the
corresponding sophisticated behavior is to stop immediately (i.e., τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0).
If we instead take w to be (4.12) or (4.13), similar calculations again yield supτ∈T J(x; τ) =
limλ↓0 w(λ)u
(
x
λ
)
= ∞. Thus, we have the same conclusion that τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0 and
τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
• Case II: β > 1.
Because u is first constantly zero and then concave, it is S-shaped. We then conclude from
Proposition 4.3 that τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0, and τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
In the above two examples, a na¨ıve agent always wants to continue perpetually, which prompts
the sophisticated agent to stop immediately (as shown in Proposition 4.1). It is natural to ask
whether a na¨ıve agent will indeed choose to stop under a different model parameter specification.
The answer is yes when he has a more pessimistic view prescribed by a convex w. A convex w
indicates that the agent deflates the probability of the “very good” scenarios, and inflates the
probability of the “very bad” scenarios. This contrasts the optimistic view on the “very good”
scenarios represented by an inverse S-shaped w.
With a convex w, the following example shows that a na¨ıve agent may choose to stop immedi-
ately, depending on the intensity of probability weighting relative to the agent’s risk tolerance and
the quality of the asset.
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Example 4.4. Let U(x) = xγ for some 0 < γ < 1, and w(x) = xη for some η > 1. Then,
u(x) = U(x1/β) = xγ/β.
• Case I: 0 < γ/β ≤ 1.
As u is concave and w is convex, Corollary 4.3 of Xu and Zhou (2013) shows that the optimal
stopping time is τˆx = 0 for all x > 0. The problem is then time-consistent, and all three types
of agents (na¨ıve, pre-committed, and sophisticated) stop immediately.
Note that u is concave here because β > 0 is not small enough, i.e., the asset is not good
enough. With such an asset at hand, the pessimistic view from a convex w leads the agent
to liquidate the asset immediately. The moral of this result is that “never lay your hands on
a bad stock if you are pessimistic”.
• Case II: γ/β > 1.
As u is convex, we can find optimal stopping times using (4.10), which now takes the form
supλ∈(0,1] λ
η−γ/βxγ/β . If η ≥ γ/β, λ∗ = 1 is the maximizer, and thus τˆx = inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t ≥
x} = 0 is the optimal stopping time. Hence, there is no time-inconsistency when η ≥ γ/β,
and all three types of agents stop immediately.
The interesting case is η < γ/β, in which supλ∈(0,1] λ
η−γ/βxγ/β = ∞, not attainable by any
λ ∈ (0, 1]. In this case, an optimal stopping time τˆx fails to exist for all x > 0. The na¨ıve
stopping law is therefore τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0. This leads to the equilibrium τˆ∗(x) =
Θτˆ(x) = 0 for all x > 0, thanks to Proposition 4.1.
In the above example, η ≡ w′(1) measures the intensity of probability weighting on very un-
favorable events, 1 − γ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion of the agent, and β
measures the goodness of the asset (the large β is, the worse the asset; recall the explanation below
(4.3)). When the agent sufficiently inflates the probabilities of bad scenarios relative to his risk
tolerance and the quality of the asset (i.e., η ≥ γ/β), he liquidates the asset immediately no matter
what type of agent he is. Otherwise (i.e., η < γ/β), he always intends to continue if he is na¨ıve,
and stops right away if he is sophisticated.
In fact, a convex probability distortion function w can generate richer behaviors than the two
extremes “never stop” and “stop immediately” as depicted in most previous examples. The next
example shows that both the na¨ıve and sophisticated agents may actually agree on a threshold-type
strategy, as in (4.18) below.
Example 4.5. Let U(x) = (x − K)+ for some K > 0 and w(x) = 12(x
2 + x). Then, u(x) =
U(x1/β) = (x1/β −K)+. We assume that β ≥ 1, which will be crucial in the calculation below. For
any x > 0, define τab := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t /∈ (a, b)} for a < b. First, we claim that for each x > 0,
sup
τ∈T
J(x; τ) = sup
0≤a≤x≤b<∞
J(x; τab) = sup
0≤a≤Kβ∧x, Kβ∨x≤b<∞
J(x; τab). (4.17)
The first equality was established in Theorem 4.2 of Xu and Zhou (2013). Now we prove the second
equality. For x ≤ Kβ, observe that if a ≤ x ≤ b ≤ Kβ, then J(x; τab) = 0 as u(a) = u(b) = 0. This
already implies that (4.17) is true. For x ≤ Kβ, by the convexity of w and the concavity of u on
[Kβ,∞), the same argument in Corollary 4.3 of Xu and Zhou (2013) shows that
sup
Kβ≤a≤x≤b<∞
J(x; τab) ≤ u(x).
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It follows that (4.17) holds. Now, for any a ≤ Kβ ∧ x and b ≥ Kβ ∨ x,
f(a, b) := J(x; τab) = u(a) + w
(
x− a
b− a
)
(u(b)− u(a)) =
1
2
[(
x− a
b− a
)2
+
x− a
b− a
]
(b1/β −K),
where the second equality follows from Lemma B.1 and the third equality is due to u(a) = 0 for
a ≤ Kβ. For any fixed b ≥ Kβ ∨ x, observe that f(0, b) ≥ f(a, b) for all 0 < a ≤ x. Then a direct
calculation yields
∂f(0, b)
∂b
=
x
2b3
h(b), where h(b) :=
(
1
β
− 1
)
b
1
β
+1 −
(
1
β
− 2
)
xb
1
β +Kb+ 2xK.
We deduce from
h′′(b) = −
1
β
(
1−
1
β
)
b
1
β
−1
[(
1
β
+ 1
)
−
(
2−
1
β
)
x
b
]
that on (0,∞), h starts being convex, becomes less convex as b increases, and eventually turns
concave. This, together with h(0) = 2xK > 0 and h(∞) = −∞, shows that there exists a unique
b∗(x) > 0 such that h(b∗) = 0. As a consequence, h(x) > 0 if and only if x < b∗(x). Because
h(x) = x
[(
2
β
− 3
)
x
1
β + 3K
]
we conclude that x < b∗(x) if and only if x < x¯ :=
(
3K
3−2/β
)β
. Thus,
τˆx := τ0b∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t ≥ b
∗(x)} =
{
> 0 if 0 < x < x¯,
= 0 if x ≥ x¯
is an optimal stopping time of (2.1), with J(x; τ) specified in (4.8). Time-inconsistency is present
here as the stopping threshold b∗(x) depends on the current state x. The na¨ıve stopping law is
τˆ(x) = 1(0,x¯)(x), for all x > 0. (4.18)
Remarkably, this is already an equilibrium stopping law. To see this, for x ≥ x¯, L∗τˆ(x) = 0 and thus
J(x;L∗τˆ(x)) = u(x), which yields [x¯,∞) ⊆ Iτˆ . For x < x¯, L
∗τˆ(x) = τ0x¯ = inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t ≥ x¯}.
Then
J(x;L∗τˆ(x)) = w
(x
x¯
)
u(x¯) =
1
2
[(x
x¯
)2
+
x
x¯
]
(x¯
1
β −K)+,
where the first equality is due to Lemma B.1. If x ≤ Kβ, J(x;L∗τˆ(x)) > 0 = u(x), which implies
(0,Kβ ] ⊆ Cτˆ . Now, observe that the curve
y = g(x) :=
1
2
[(x
x¯
)2
+
x
x¯
]
(x¯
1
β −K) =
u(x¯)
2x¯2
(
x+
x¯
2
)2
−
u(x¯)
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is a convex quadratic function that intersects the concave function y = κ(x) := x1/β −K at x = x¯.
Moreover, it can be checked that g′(x¯) = κ′(x¯), which implies that x = x¯ is the only intersection of
these curves and g(x) > κ(x) on (0, x¯). If x ∈ (Kβ, x¯), observe that J(x;L∗τˆ(x)) = g(x) > κ(x) =
u(x), which shows that (Kβ, x¯) ⊆ Cτˆ . We therefore conclude that Cτˆ = (0, x¯) and Iτˆ = [x¯,∞). It
follows that Θτˆ(x) = 1(0,x¯) + τˆ(x)1[x¯,∞) = τˆ(x) for all x > 0. That is, τˆ ∈ E(R+), and thus τˆ∗ = τˆ .
Remark 4.3. The above example is consistent with Proposition 4.4. Indeed, with β = 1, we have
x¯ = 3K in the above example. This coincides with the threshold η+1η K = 3K in Proposition 4.4,
when we take η = 1/2 therein.
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4.3 A Case Study: Finding and Comparing Equilibrium Stopping Laws
In this subsection, we focus on the case where
u(x) = (x−K)+ and w(x) = ηx2 + (1− η)x, (4.19)
for some K > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1). Our goal is to demonstrate how fixed-point iteration in Theorem 4.1
can be used to find a large class of equilibrium stopping laws. We will also discuss how one can
possibly compare these different equilibria.
All the proofs in this subsection are relegated to Appendix D.
We start with identifying (pre-committed) optimal stopping times and the corresponding na¨ıve
stopping law.
Proposition 4.4. Assume u and w are given by (4.19). For x >
(1−η
η ∧ 1
)
K, an optimal stopping
time of (2.1) is
τˆx :=
{
inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x} = 0, if x >
η+1
η K,
inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥
2ηKx
η(x+K)−K } > 0, if
(1−η
η ∧ 1
)
K < x ≤ η+1η K.
For x ≤
(1−η
η ∧ 1
)
K, there exists no optimal stopping time. Hence, the na¨ıve stopping law is a
threshold-type strategy
τˆ(x) = 1(
0, η+1
η
K
)(x), for all x > 0. (4.20)
Remark 4.4. We observe time-inconsistency in Proposition 4.4: the stopping threshold 2ηKxη(x+K)−K
in τˆx depends on current state x, when
(1−η
η ∧ 1
)
K < x ≤ η+1η K.
With (4.20), it is interesting that even a na¨ıve agent will stop, seemingly contradicting Ebert and Strack
(2015). However, there is really no contradiction – the convexity of w violates Assumption 2 of
Ebert and Strack (2015). In economic terms, a convex distortion overweights the small probabilities
of very bad events and underweights those of very good events; so a small, right-skewed, lottery-like
gamble is unattractive to the agent. As a result, he decides that he will stop once the process hits
the threshold, η+1η K. This also suggests that RDU/CPT together with the results derived in this
paper can indeed offer realistic predictions, if we allow modeling of different types of preferences
and different characteristics of the underlying process.
Given that the na¨ıve stopping law is a threshold-type strategy as in (4.20), the next result looks
for equilibrium stopping laws of the same form.
Proposition 4.5. Assume u and w are given by (4.19). For any b > 0, consider τ := 1(0,b) ∈
T (R+). If b ≤
η+1
η K, then τ ∈ E(R+). If b >
η+1
η K, then τ /∈ E(R+) but Θτ ∈ E(R+); specifically,
there exists b′ ∈ (Kη ,
η+1
η K) such that
τ∗(x) = lim
n→∞
Θnτ(x) = Θτ(x) = 1(0,b′)(x), ∀x > 0.
Hence, 1(0,b) ∈ E(R+) if and only if 0 < b ≤
η+1
η K.
Remark 4.5. Remarkably, it follows from Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 that the na¨ıve stopping law τˆ
in (4.20) is already an equilibrium, i.e., τˆ∗ = τˆ .
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In view of Proposition 4.5 and Remark 2.6, we have found an uncountable set of equilibrium
stopping laws of threshold-type
E ′(R+) :=
{
1(0,b) : 0 ≤ b ≤
(
η + 1
η
)
K
}
,
where 1(0,0) denotes the trivial equilibrium specified in Remark 2.6. It is natural to ask how one can
compare these different equilibria, and whether there exists a best equilibrium, in any reasonable
sense.
One possibility is to investigate the choice from the perspective of the agent at time 0. Assume
that the agent at time 0 intends to choose τ ∈ E ′(R+) to maximize the expected discounted payoff,
i.e.,
sup
τ∈E ′(R+)
J(x;Lτ(x)) = sup
b∈
[
0, η+1
η
K
]J(x;T x[b,∞)), with T x[b,∞) defined in (2.13). (4.21)
Proposition 4.6. Assume u and w are given by (4.19). For 0 < x <
(η+1
η
)
K, τˆ in (4.20) is the
unique maximizer of (4.21). For x ≥
(η+1
η
)
K, τ 7→ J(x;Lτ(x)) is a constant function on E ′(R+).
An intriguing implication of Proposition 4.6 is that not only the agent at time 0 but also all his
future selves would like to use the equilibrium τˆ in (4.20), as it is optimal for (4.21) at every state
x > 0. This corresponds to the notion of an optimal equilibrium introduced in Huang and Zhou
(2019): it is an equilibrium that generates larger value than any other equilibrium does at every
state, i.e., a universally dominating equilibrium. For stopping problems under non-exponential
discounting, Huang and Zhou (2019) and (2017) establish the existence of an optimal equilibrium,
under appropriate conditions on the discount function. Under the current setting of probability
distortion, it is natural to ask if the result in Proposition 4.6 can be extended to general u and w.
Finding economically meaningful conditions on these functions under which an optimal equilibrium
exists is an interesting direction for future research.
We can further quantify the cost of not following the optimal equilibrium τˆ in (4.20). Specifically,
when the agent is at a given state x > 0, if he follows an equilibrium τb := 1(0,b) ∈ E
′(R+) with
b < 1+ηη K, the cost c ≥ 0 is defined as the additional cash needed to raise the value of the inferior
equilibrium τb to that of the optimal equilibrium τˆ . That is, c ≥ 0 is the solution to∫ ∞
0
w
(
P[u(XxLτb(x) + c) > y]
)
dy =
∫ ∞
0
w
(
P[u(XxLτˆ(x)) > y]
)
dy = J(x,Lτˆ (x)). (4.22)
Note that c = c(x, b) depends on the state x > 0 and the threshold b ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.7. Assume u and w are given by (4.19), and let b∗ :=
(η+1
η
)
K. Given 0 < x < b∗,
the cost c = c(x, b) admits the formula
c(x, b) = K − (b ∨ x) +
K
η
(
w (x/b∗)
w ((x/b) ∧ 1)
)
> 0, for all 0 ≤ b < b∗.
Given x ≥ b∗, c(x, b) = 0 for all 0 ≤ b < b∗.
Instead of the stringent “uniform optimality” as above, Pareto optimality has been widely used
in the literature to compare different equilibria. It can be formulated in the current context as
follows.
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Definition 4.1. For any τ1, τ2 ∈ E(R+), we say τ1 dominates τ2 if J(x,Lτ1(x)) ≥ J(x,Lτ2(x)) for
all x > 0. Furthermore, we say τ ∈ A ⊆ E(R+) is Pareto optimal in A if τ cannot be dominated
by any other τ ′ ∈ A.
Proposition 4.8. Assume u and w are given by (4.19). For any 1(0,b), 1(0,b′) ∈ E
′(R+), 1(0,b)
dominates 1(0,b′) if and only if b ≥ b
′. Hence, τˆ in (4.20) is the only Pareto optimal equilibrium in
E ′(R+).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have established a fixed-point characterization of equilibrium stopping laws for
time-inconsistent stopping problems. This provides a new, convenient way to search for equilibrium
laws, through fixed-point iterations. In addition, it spells out how the na¨ıve stopping law τˆ (defined
in (3.5)) can be transformed into an equilibrium law τˆ∗.
Our framework is general enough to cover many well-known time-inconsistent stopping prob-
lems. In particular, we apply our theoretic results to the case where the agent distorts probability
and the underlying state process is a geometric Brownian motion. From all the examples we stud-
ied, including those in Subsection 4.2 and the case study in Subsection 4.3, we observe that under
β > 0 (where time-inconsistency is present), whenever the iteration starts with the na¨ıve law τˆ ,
we fall in one of the two cases: (a) the na¨ıve law τˆ is to continue perpetually and the correspond-
ing equilibrium law τˆ∗ is to stop immediately, and (b) τˆ is aligned with τˆ∗, and they are both
threshold-type strategies. Whether this is a general result that can be established theoretically is
an interesting topic for future research.
A Proof of Proposition 3.1
To prove Proposition 3.1, we need to first analyze certain crossing probabilities for the one-
dimensional diffusion X introduced in Section 3. To this end, we consider the running maximum
and minimum processes defined respectively by
X
x
t := max
s∈[0,t]
Xxs and X
x
t := min
s∈[0,t]
Xxs , t ≥ 0.
Also, we consider the first revisit time to the initial value x:
T xx := inf{t > 0 : X
x
t = x} ∈ T . (A.1)
Lemma A.1. Suppose (3.1) holds and Z defined in (3.2) is a martingale. Then, for any x ∈ X,
P[X
x
t > x] = P[X
x
t < x] = 1 for all t > 0. Hence, T
x
x = 0 a.s.
Proof. First, recall from Problem 7.18 on p. 94 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) that if W is a
standard Brownian motion defined on a probability space (Ω′,F ′,P′), then
P′[W t > 0] = P
′[W t < 0] = 1, for all t > 0, (A.2)
where W t := maxs∈[0,t]Ws and W t := mins∈[0,t]Ws.
Fix T > 0. With Z in (3.2) being a martingale, we can define a probability Q ≈ P by
dQ
dP = ZT . Note that we have Q ≈ P, instead of merely Q ≪ P, because ZT > 0 P-a.s. under
(3.1). Girsanov’s theorem then implies that under Q, dXt = a(Xt)dB˜t for t ∈ [0, T ], where
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B˜t := B(t)+
∫ t
0 θ(Xs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], is a Q-Brownian motion. As X is a continuous local martingale
under Q, it can be expressed as a time-changed Brownian motion, i.e.,
Xt = x+W[X]t t ∈ [0, T ],
for some standard Brownian motion {Wt}t≥0 under Q. As a consequence,
Q[XT ≥ x+ η] = Q[Xs ≥ x+ η, for some 0 ≤ s ≤ T ]
= Q[W[X]s ≥ η, for some 0 ≤ s ≤ T ]
= Q[Ws ≥ η, for some 0 ≤ s ≤ [X]T ].
This implies
Q[X
x
T > x] = lim
η↓0
Q[X
x
T ≥ x+ η] = lim
η↓0
EQ
[
1{Ws≥η, for some 0≤s≤[X]T }
]
. (A.3)
In view of (A.2), we have Q[W t > 0] = 1 for all t > 0. This implies that we can find some Ω
∗ ∈ F
with Q(Ω∗) = 1 such that for each ω ∈ Ω∗, there exist a real sequence {tn(ω)} with tn(ω) ↓ 0 and
Wtn(ω)(ω) > 0. It follows that for each ω ∈ Ω
∗,
1{Ws≥η, for some 0≤s≤[X]T }(ω) = 1, as η small enough.
We hence conclude from (A.3) that Q[X
x
T > x] = 1. Similarly, we have
Q[XxT < x] = lim
η↓0
Q[XT ≤ x− η] = lim
η↓0
EQ
[
1{Ws≤−η, for some 0≤s≤[X]T }
]
= 1, (A.4)
where the last equality follows from Q[W t < 0] = 1 for all t > 0, as shown in (A.2). With Q ≈ P,
we conclude that P[X
x
T > x] = Q[X
x
T > x] = 1 and P[X
x
T < x] = Q[X
x
T < x] = 1.
Note that the result “P[X
x
T > x] = P[X
x
T < x] = 1 for all T > 0” implies that for any T = 1/n,
n ∈ N, the process Xx will cross the horizontal line of level x during the time interval (0, 1/n) P-a.s.
As a result, T xx < 1/n P-a.s. for all n ∈ N, and thus T
x
x = 0 P-a.s.
Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For any x ∈ ker(τ), there are three possible cases:
1. x is an interior point of ker(τ): Then L∗τ(x) = 0 by definition, and thus J(x;L∗τ(x)) = u(x),
i.e., x ∈ Iτ .
2. x is a boundary point of ker(τ): By Lemma A.1, P[X
x
t > x] = P[X
x
t < x] = 1 for all t > 0.
This implies L∗τ(x) = inf{t > 0 : Xxt ∈ ker(τ)} < 1/n for all n ∈ N a.s., and thus L
∗τ(x) = 0
a.s. It follows that J(x;L∗τ(x)) = u(x), i.e., x ∈ Iτ .
3. x is an isolated point of ker(τ), i.e., ∃ ε > 0 such that (x−ε, x+ε)∩ker(τ) = {x}: As T xx = 0
a.s. (by Lemma A.1), L∗τ(x) = 0 a.s. This gives J(x;L∗τ(x)) = u(x), i.e., x ∈ Iτ .
It follows that ker(τ) ⊆ Iτ . This, together with (2.10), shows that ker(Θτ) = Sτ ∪ (Iτ ∩ ker(τ)) =
Sτ ∪ ker(τ). By repeating the same argument above for each n > 1, we obtain (3.3).
As {ker(Θnτ)}n∈N is a nondecreasing sequence of Borel sets, if x ∈
⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
nτ), then there
exists N > 0 such that Θnτ(x) = 0 for all n ≥ N ; if x /∈
⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
nτ), then Θnτ(x) = 1
for all n ∈ N . This already implies that the limit-taking in (2.15) is well-defined, and ker(τ∗) =⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
nτ).
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B Proof of Lemma 4.1
To prove Lemma 4.1, we need the following technical result.
Lemma B.1. Suppose β > 0. For any 0 ≤ a < x < b, denote τab := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t /∈ (a, b)} ∈ T .
(i) If a = 0 and b =∞, then J(x; τab) = 0;
(ii) If a > 0 and b =∞, then J(x; τab) = u(a);
(iii) If a ≥ 0 and b <∞, then
J(x; τab) = u(a) + w
(
x− a
b− a
)
(u(b)− u(a)). (B.1)
Proof. First note that parts of this lemma were derived in Xu and Zhou (2013), while the cases
where P[τab =∞] > 0 were not dealt with there. This includes “a = 0 and b =∞” and “a = 0 and
b < ∞”. For completeness and reader’s convenience, we present the proof for all possible cases of
0 ≤ a < b ≤ ∞.
Recall that τab = T
x
a ∧ T
x
b , with T
x
a and T
x
b defined as in (4.6), and u is nondecreasing with
u(0) = 0 when β > 0.
(i) Observe that τab =∞ a.s. By (4.5), J(x; τab) =
∫∞
0 w(P[u(0) > y])dy = 0.
(ii) Thanks to (4.5), u(Xxτab) = u(a) a.s. It follows that J(x; τab) =
∫∞
0 w(P[u(a) > y])dy = u(a).
(iii) We first deal with the case “a > 0 and b < ∞”. The CDF of Xxτab is F (y) = p
∗1[a,b)(y) +
1[b,∞)(y) for y ∈ [0, 1], where p
∗ := P[Xxτab = a] =
b−x
b−a by the optional sampling theorem. Note that
the use of the optional sampling theorem to find p∗ requires either P[T xa <∞] = 1 or P[T
x
b <∞] = 1.
The former is true here thanks to a > 0 and (4.5). By the distribution formulation ((3.1) in
Xu and Zhou (2013)),
J(x; τab) =
∫ a
0
w(1)u′(y)dy +
∫ b
a
w
(
1−
b− x
b− a
)
u′(y)dy +
∫ ∞
b
w(0)u′(y)dy,
which yields the desired result as w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
For the case “a = 0 and b < ∞”, by the fact that Xx does not reach a = 0 a.s. and (4.5),
Xxτab = b1{Txb <∞} a.s. This, together with u(0) = 0, gives u(X
x
τab
) = u(b)1{Txb <∞} a.s. It follows
that
J(x; τab) =
∫ ∞
0
w
(
P[u(b)1{Txb <∞} > y]
)
dy =
∫ u(b)
0
w
(
P[u(b)1{Txb <∞} > y]
)
dy
=
∫ u(b)
0
w(P[T xb <∞])dy = w(P[T
x
b <∞])u(b) = w
(x
b
)
u(b),
where the last equality follows from (4.6). Thus, the formula (B.1) still holds for a = 0.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 4.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Fix a D ∈ B(R+). For any x > 0, define
a(x) := sup{a < x : a ∈ D}, b(x) := inf{b > x : b ∈ D}. (B.2)
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If a(x) = x or b(x) = x, then T xD = 0 a.s. and thus J(x;T
x
D) = u(x). If a(x) < x < b(x), then
T xD = inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t /∈ (a(x), b(x))}. We then deduce from Lemma B.1 that
J(x;T xD) =

u(x), if a(x) = x or b(x) = x,
u(a(x)) + w
(
x−a(x)
b(x)−a(x)
)
(u(b(x)) − u(a(x))), if a(x) < x < b(x) <∞,
u(a(x)), if 0 < a(x) < x < b(x) =∞,
0, if 0 = a(x) < x < b(x) =∞.
(B.3)
Now, note that with DQ := {q ∈ Q : a ≤ q ≤ b for some a, b ∈ D},
a(x) = sup{q < x : q ∈ DQ} = sup
q∈DQ
q1(q,∞)(x), b(x) = inf{q > x : q ∈ DQ} = inf
q∈DQ
q1(0,q)(x).
It follows that x 7→ a(x) and b 7→ b(x) are both Borel measurable. We then conclude form (B.3)
that x 7→ J(x;T xD) is Borel measurable, i.e., Assumption 2.1 (i) is satisfied.
Fix a sequence {Dn}n∈N in B(R+) such that Dn ⊆ Dn+1 for all n ∈ N. For any x > 0, consider
a(x) and b(x) as in (B.2) with D :=
⋃
n∈NDn. Moreover, we define
an(x) := sup{a < x : a ∈ Dn}, bn(x) := inf{b > x : b ∈ Dn}, for all n ∈ N.
As Dn ⊆ Dn+1 for all n ∈ N, we have an(x) ↑ a(x) and bn(x) ↓ b(x) as n→∞. For each n ∈ N, by
the same argument above (B.3),
J(x;T xDn) =

u(x), if an(x) = x or bn(x) = x,
u(an(x)) + w
(
x−an(x)
bn(x)−an(x)
)
(u(bn(x))− u(an(x))), if an(x) < x < bn(x) <∞,
u(an(x)), if 0 < an(x) < x < bn(x) =∞,
0, if 0 = an(x) < x < bn(x) =∞.
From the above formula and (B.3), one may deduce from the continuity of u and w and the
convergence an(x) ↑ a(x) and bn(x) ↓ b(x) that
lim
n→∞
J(x;T xDn) = J(x;T
x
D). (B.4)
Indeed, the only nontrivial case is “a(x) = b(x) = x while an(x) < x < bn(x) for all n ∈ N”. In this
case,
lim
n→∞
J(x;T xDn) = limn→∞
[
u(an(x)) + w
(
x− an(x)
bn(x)− an(x)
)
(u(bn(x))− u(an(x)))
]
= u(x) + lim
n→∞
[
w
(
x− an(x)
bn(x)− an(x)
)
(u(bn(x))− u(an(x)))
]
= u(x) = J(x;T xD),
where the third equality follows from a(x) = b(x) = x and w being a bounded function. Then (B.4)
in particular implies that Assumption 2.1 (ii) is satisfied.
C Proofs for Subsection 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Thanks to (4.14), for each x > 0, τˆ (x) = 0 if and only if G∗x(·) ≡ x.
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(i) With y∗ < ∞, we observe from w′(0+) = ∞ that for any λ ≥ 0, the term (u′)−1ℓ
(
λ
w′(1−y)
)
in (5.6) of Xu and Zhou (2013) increases to y∗ as y ↑ 1. Then, for any x > 0, (5.7) of Xu and Zhou
(2013) implies that G∗x(·) ≡ x holds only when a
∗ = x ≥ y∗. This already shows that τˆ(x) = 1
for all x < y∗. Now, for x ≥ y∗, observe that with a = x, the constraint in (5.6) of Xu and Zhou
(2013) becomes
xq +
∫ 1
q
x ∨ (u′)−1ℓ
(
λ
w′(1− y)
)
dy = xq +
∫ 1
q
xdy = x.
That is, the constraint is satisfied for any λ ≥ 0. Similarly, with a = x and any λ ≥ 0, the objective
function in (5.6) of Xu and Zhou (2013) has the value
(1− w(1− q))u(x) +
∫ 1
q
u (x)w′(1− y)dy = u(x) = sup
y>0
u(y).
This already attains the maximum of (5.6) in Xu and Zhou (2013). Indeed, the maximization
therein can be simplified as
max
a,λ≥0
{
(1− w(1 − q))u(a) +
∫ 1
q
u
(
a ∨ (u′)−1ℓ
(
λ
w′(1− y)
))
w′(1− y)dy
}
=max
a≥y∗
{
(1− w(1 − q))u(a) +
∫ 1
q
u (a)w′(1− y)dy
}
= max
a≥y∗
u(a) = sup
y>0
u(y).
We therefore conclude that a∗ = x and any λ ≥ 0 form a solution to (5.6) of Xu and Zhou (2013),
which yields G∗x(·) ≡ x. Thus, τˆ(x) = 0 for all x ≥ y
∗. We therefore obtain τˆ(x) = 1(0,y∗)(x)
for all x > 0. Finally, for any x ≥ y∗, L∗τˆ(x) = 0 and thus J(x;L∗τˆ(x)) = u(x), which implies
Θτˆ(x) = τˆ(x) = 0. For any x < y∗, L∗τˆ (x) is the first hitting time of Xx to the value y∗. Thus,
J(x;L∗τˆ(x)) =
∫∞
0 w(P[u(y
∗) > y])dy = u(y∗) ≥ u(x). It follows that Θτˆ(x) = 1 = τˆ(x). As a
result, τˆ∗(x) = Θτˆ(x) = τˆ(x) for all x > 0.
(ii) If λ∗ = 0, then (u′)−1ℓ
(
λ∗
w′(1−y)
)
= (u′)−1ℓ (0) = ∞ in (5.6) of Xu and Zhou (2013) for all
y ∈ (q, 1), as supy>0 u(y) is not attained. This implies that the constraint in (5.6) of Xu and Zhou
(2013) cannot be satisfied, a contradiction. Assume λ∗ > 0. Because w′(0+) = ∞, λ
∗
w′(1−y) → 0
as y ↑ 1. The concavity of u and the fact that supy>0 u(y) is not attained then imply that
(u′)−1ℓ
(
λ∗
w′(1−y)
)
→ ∞ as y ↑ 1, which shows G∗x(·) 6≡ x. Thus, τˆ(x) = 1 for all x > 0. By
Proposition 4.1, τˆ∗(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. In Xu and Zhou (2013), while the mathematical program for G∗x in Sec-
tion 6 (for S-shaped u) is more complicated than that in Theorem 5.2 (for concave u), we note
that under the condition G∗x(·) ≡ x they actually coincide. Thus, the same argument in the proof
of Proposition 4.2 can be used to establish the desired results.
D Proofs for Subsection 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.4. As u is convex, (2.1) is equivalent to (4.10), given by supλ∈(0,1] f(λ) with
f(λ) := (ηλ2 + (1− η)λ)
(
x
λ −K
)+
. For x > K, f ′(λ) = ηx− (1− η)K − 2ηKλ. Define
λ¯ :=
η(x+K)−K
2ηK
.
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If x > η+1η K, f
′(λ) > (η + 1)K − (1− η)K − 2ηK = 0 for all λ ∈ (0, 1], which implies that λ∗ = 1
is the maximizer. If K < x ≤ η+1η K, then λ
∗ = λ¯ ≤ 1 is the maximizer. For x ≤ K, observe that
f(λ) =
{
−ηK
[
λ− λ¯
]2
+ (1− η)x+ ηKλ¯2, if 0 < λ ≤ xK ,
0, if xK < λ ≤ 1.
(D.1)
If η ≤ 1/2, then λ¯ ≤ x−K4ηK ≤ 0. This, together with (D.1), implies that supλ∈(0,1] f(λ) admits
no maximizer. If η > 1/2, then for x > 1−ηη K, it can be checked that λ¯ ∈ (0,
x
K ), which implies
that λ∗ = λ¯ is the maximizer (thanks again to (D.1)); for x ≤ 1−ηη K, we have λ¯ ≤ 0 and thus
supλ∈(0,1] f(λ) admits no maximizer. Summarizing these cases leads to the formula of τˆx. The
na¨ıve stopping law follows directly from the formula of τˆx.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. For b ≤ K, J(x;L∗τ(x)) = u(x) for all x > 0, and thus Iτ = R+. This
implies Θτ(x) = 1(0,b)(x) = τ(x) for all x > 0, i.e., τ ∈ E(R+). In the rest of the proof, we assume
b > K. For x ≥ b, L∗τ(x) = 0 and thus J(x;L∗τ(x)) = u(x), which implies [b,∞) ⊆ Iτ . For
0 < x ≤ K, J(x;L∗τ(x)) > 0 = u(x) and thus (0,K] ⊆ Cτ . For K < x < b, Lemma B.1-(iii) gives
J(x;L∗τ(x))− u(x) =
(
η
x2
b2
+ (1− η)
x
b
)
(b−K)− (x−K)
=
η(b−K)
b2
[
x2 −
(
b+
Kb
η(b−K)
)
x+
Kb2
η(b−K)
]
=
η(b−K)
b2
(x− b)
(
x− b′
)
, where b′ :=
Kb
η(b−K)
>
K
η
. (D.2)
For b > η+1η K, observe that
b′ <
η + 1
η
K. (D.3)
Indeed, b′/(η+1η K) =
b
(η+1)(b−k) < 1 if and only if 0 < η(b−K)−K, which is equivalent to b >
η+1
η K.
Because (D.3) in particular implies b′ < b, we deduce from (D.2) that J(x;L∗τ(x)) − u(x) > 0 for
K < x < b′, J(x;L∗τ(x)) − u(x) < 0 for b′ < x < b, and J(x;L∗τ(b′)) − u(b′) = 0. We therefore
conclude that Sτ = (b
′, b), Cτ = (0, b
′), and Iτ = {b
′} ∪ [b,∞), which implies
τ1 := Θτ(x) = 1(0,b′](x) for all x > 0.
By the same argument above (D.2), we obtain [b′,∞) ⊆ Iτ1 , (0,K] ⊆ Cτ1 , and when K < x < b
′,
J(x;L∗τ1(x))− u(x) =
η(b′ −K)
(b′)2
(x− b′)
(
x− b′′
)
, with b′′ :=
Kb′
η(b′ −K)
.
As (D.3) yields Kη(b′−K) > 1, we have b
′′ > b′. It follows that J(x;L∗τ1(x)) − u(x) > 0 for all
K < x < b′. We thus conclude that Cτ1 = (0, b
′) and Iτ1 = [b
′′,∞), which shows that
Θτ1(x) = 1(0,b′](x) = τ1(x) for all x > 0.
That is, Θτ = τ1 ∈ E(R+) and τ∗(x) = limn→∞Θ
nτ(x) = Θτ(x) = 1(0,b′](x) for all x > 0.
Finally, for b ∈ (K, η+1η K], we have b
′ ≥ η+1η K, by the same argument below (D.3). With
b′ ≥ b, we deduce from (D.2) that Cτ = (0, b) and Iτ = [b,∞). Thus, Θτ(x) = 1(0,b)(x) = τ(x) for
all x > 0, i.e., τ ∈ E(R+).
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Proof of Proposition 4.6. For any x <
(η+1
η
)
K, we deduce from Lemma B.1 (iii) that
sup
b∈[0, η+1
η
K]
J(x;T x[b,∞)) = sup
b∈[x, η+1
η
K]
(
η
x2
b2
+ (1− η)
x
b
)
(b−K) = sup
b∈[x, η+1
η
K]
xg(1/b) + (1− η)x,
where g(y) := −ηKxy2 + [η(x + K) − K]y. The quadratic function g(y) attains a unique global
maximum on R at yˆ = η(x+K)−K2ηKx . If x ≤
(1−η
η
)
K, then yˆ ≤ 0. This implies b 7→ g(1/b) is strictly
increasing on [x, η+1η K], and the maximum is attained at b
∗ = η+1η K. If x >
(1−η
η
)
K, then yˆ > 0. It
can be checked that x <
(η+1
η
)
K if and only if 1/yˆ >
(η+1
η
)
K. This again implies that b 7→ g(1/b)
is strictly increasing on [x, η+1η K], and the maximum is attained at b
∗ = η+1η K.
For any x ≥
(η+1
η
)
K, we simply have J(x;T x[b,∞)) = u(x) for all b ∈
[
0, η+1η K
]
.
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Fix 0 < x < b∗. By the proof of Proposition 4.6 (see above), we have
J(x,Lτˆ (x)) = w
(
x
b∗
)
K
η . Given 0 ≤ b < b
∗, let τb := 1(0,b) ∈ E
′(R+). If b ≤ x, then Lτb(x) = 0.
Thus, the left hand side of (4.22) becomes
∫∞
0 w (P[(x+ c−K)
+ > y]) dy = (x+ c−K)+. Solving
(4.22) then yields
c = K − x+ w
( x
b∗
) K
η
. (D.4)
Note that c > 0. If x ≤ K, c > 0 by definition. If x > K, we deduce again from Lτb(x) = 0 that
x−K =
∫ ∞
0
w
(
P[u(XxLτb(x)) > y]
)
dy = J(x,Lτb(x)) < J(x,Lτˆ(x)) = w
( x
b∗
) K
η
,
where the inequality follows from Proposition 4.6. This shows that c > 0.
It remains to deal with the case b > x. First, we observe that
w
( x
b∗
) K
η
− w
(x
b
)
b =
[
η
( x
b∗
)2
+ (1− η)
x
b∗
]
K
η
−
[
η
(x
b
)2
+ (1− η)
x
b
]
b
= η
[( x
b∗
)2 K
η
−
(x
b
)2
b
]
+ (1− η)
[
x
b∗
K
η
+ x
]
= ηx2
[
1
(1 + η)b∗
−
1
b
]
−
η(1− η)x
1 + η
< 0, (D.5)
where the third equality follows from b∗ = η+1η K, and the inequality is due to x > 0, η ∈ (0, 1),
and 0 < b < b∗. Now, because b > x implies Lτb(x) = T
x
b and u(X
x
Txb
+ c) = u(c)1{Txb =∞} + u(b+
c)1{Txb <∞}, the argument in the last equation of the proof of Lemma B.1 (see Appendix B) gives∫ ∞
0
w
(
P[u(XxLτb(x) + c) > y]
)
dy =
∫ u(c)
0
w(1)dy +
∫ u(b+c)
u(c)
w (P[T xb <∞]) dy
= u(c) + w
(x
b
)
(u(b+ c)− u(b)) = (c−K)+ + w
(x
b
)
((b+ c−K)+ − (c−K)+). (D.6)
We claim that c < K. Indeed, if c ≥ K, solving (4.22), with the aid of (D.6), yields c = K +
w
(
x
b∗
)
K
η − w
(
x
b
)
b. By (D.5), this implies c < K, a contradiction. Knowing that c < K, (D.6)
yields
∫∞
0 w
(
P[u(XxLτb(x) + c) > y]
)
dy = w
(
x
b
)
(b+ c−K)+. Solving (4.22) thus gives
c = K − b+
K
η
w (x/b∗)
w (x/b)
. (D.7)
28
Note that c < K can be easily verified: by (D.5), [w (x/b∗)K/η]/[w (x/b) b] < 1, which implies
c = K − b
(
1 − [w (x/b∗)K/η]/[w (x/b) b]
)
< K. Also, c is positive: if b ≤ K, then c > 0 by
definition; if b > K, then w (x/b) (b−K) = J(x,Lτb(x)) < J(x,Lτˆ(x)) = w (x/b
∗)K/η, where the
first equality follows from Lemma B.1 (iii) and the inequality is due to Proposition 4.6. This shows
that c > 0. Combining (D.4) and (D.7) then gives the desired result.
Given x ≥ b∗, because τ 7→ J(x;Lτ(x)) is a constant function on E ′(R+) (Proposition 4.6),
c(x, b) = 0 for all 0 < b < b∗.
Proof of Proposition 4.8. The proof of Proposition 4.6 shows that b 7→ J(x;T x[b,∞)) in nondecreasing
on [0, η+1η K], for any x > 0. This directly implies the first assertion. It follows that 1(0,b) can be
Pareto optimal in E ′(R+) only when b takes the largest possible value
η+1
η K.
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